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Abstract
The existence of entropy and its increase can be understood with-
out reference to either statistical mechanics or heat engines.
In days long gone, the second law of thermodynamics (which predated
the first law) was regarded as perhaps the most perfect and unassailable
law in physics. It was even supposed to have philosophical import: It has
been hailed for providing a proof of the existence of God (who started the
universe off in a state of low entropy, from which it is constantly degenerat-
ing); conversely, it has been rejected as being incompatible with dialectical
materialism and the perfectability of the human condition.
Alas, physicists themselves eventually demoted it to a lesser position in
the pantheon—because (or so it was declared) it is “merely” statistics applied
to the mechanics of large numbers of atoms. Willard Gibbs wrote: “The laws
of thermodynamics may easily be obtained from the principles of statistical
mechanics, of which they are the incomplete expression” [1]—and Ludwig
Boltzmann expressed similar sentiments.
Is this really so? Is it really true that the second law is merely an “expres-
sion” of microscopic models or could it exist in a world that was featureless
at the 10−8 cm level? We know that statistical mechanics is a powerful tool
0To be published in PHYSICS TODAY, April 2000. The publication has 4 figures,
which are not available in electronic form.
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for understanding physical phenomena and calculating many quantities, es-
pecially in systems at or near equilibrium. We use it to calculate entropy,
specific and latent heats, phase transition properties, transport coefficients
and so on, often with good accuracy. Important examples abound, such as
Max Planck’s realization that by staring into a furnace he could find Avo-
gadro’s number or Linus Pauling’s highly accurate back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation of the residual entropy of ice. But is statistical mechanics essential
for the second law?
In any event, it is still beyond anyone’s computational ability (except in
idealized situations) to account for a very precise, essentially infinitely accu-
rate law of physics from statistical mechanical principles. No exception has
ever been found to the second law of thermodynamics—not even a tiny one.
Like conservation of energy (the “first” law) the existence of a law so precise
and so independent of details of models must have a logical foundation that
is independent of the fact that matter is composed of interacting particles.
Our aim here is to explore that foundation. The full details can be found in
[2].
As Albert Einstein put it, “A theory is the more impressive the greater
the simplicity of its premises is, the more different kinds of things it re-
lates, and the more extended is its area of applicability. Therefore the deep
impression which classical thermodynamics made upon me. It is the only
physical theory of universal content concerning which I am convinced that,
within the framework of the applicability of its basic concepts, it will never
be overthrown” [3].
In an attempt to reaffirm the Second Law as a pillar of physics in its own
right, we have returned to a little noticed movement that began in the 1950’s
with the work of Peter Landsberg [4], Hans Buchdahl [5], Gottfried Falk,
Herbert Jung [6], and others (see [2] for references) and culminated in the
book of Robin Giles [7], which must be counted one of the truly great, but
unsung works in theoretical physics. It is in these works that the concept of
“comparison” (explained below) emerges as one of the key underpinnings of
the second law. The approach of these authors is quite different from lines
of thought in the tradition of Sadi Carnot that base thermodynamics on the
efficiency of heat engines. (See [8], for example, for a modern exposition of
the latter.)
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The basic question
The paradigmatic event that the second law deals with can be described as
follows. Take a macroscopic system in an equilibrium state X and place
it in a room, together with a gorilla equipped with arbitrarily complicated
machinery (a metaphor for the rest of the universe), and a weight—and close
the door. As in the old advertisement for indestructible luggage, the gorilla
can do anything to the system—including tearing it apart. At the end of
the day, however, the door is opened and the system is found in some other
equilibrium state, Y , the gorilla and machinery are found in their original
state, and the only other thing that has possibly changed is that the weight
has been raised or lowered. Let us emphasize that although our focus is on
equilibrium states, the processes that take one such state into another can
be arbitrarily violent. The gorilla knows no limits.
The question that the second law answers is this: What distinguishes
those states Y that can be reached from X in this manner from those that
cannot? The answer: There is a function of the equilibrium states, called
entropy and denoted by S, that characterizes the possible pairs of equilibrium
states X and Y by the inequality S(X) ≤ S(Y ). The function can be chosen
to be additive (in a sense explained below), and with this requirement it is
unique, up to a change of scale. Our main point is that the existence of
entropy relies only on a few basic principles, independent of any statistical
model—or even of atoms.
What is exciting about this apparently innocuous statement is the unique-
ness of entropy, for it means that all the different methods for measuring or
computing entropy must give the same answer. The usual textbook deriva-
tion of entropy as a state function, starting with some version of “the second
law”, proceeds by considering certain slow, almost reversible processes (along
adiabats and isotherms). It is not at all evident that a function obtained in
this way can contain any information about processes that are far from be-
ing slow or reversible. The clever physicist might think that with the aid of
modern computers, sophisticated feedback mechanisms, unlimited amounts
of mechanical energy (represented by the weight) and lots of plain common
sense and funding, the system could be made to go from an equilibrium state
X to Y that could not be achieved by the primitive quasistatic processes used
to define entropy in the first place. This cannot happen, however, no matter
how clever the experimentalist or how far from equilibrium one travels!
What logic lies behind this law? Why can’t one gorilla undo what another
3
one has wrought? The atomistic foundation of this logic is not as simple as
is often suggested. It not only concerns things like the enormous number of
atoms involved (1023), but also other aspects of statistical mechanics that are
beyond our present mathematical abilities. In particular, the interaction of
a system with the external world (represented by the gorilla and machinery)
cannot be described in any obvious way by Hamiltonian mechanics. Although
irreversibility is an important open problem in statistical mechanics, it is
fortunate that the logic of thermodynamics itself is independent of atoms
and can be understood without knowing its source.
The founders of thermodynamics—Rudolf Clausius, Lord Kelvin, Max
Planck, Constantin Carathe´odory, and so on—clearly had transitions be-
tween equilibrium states in mind when they stated the law in sentences such
as “No process is possible, the sole result of which is that a body is cooled
and work is done” (Kelvin). Later it became tacitly understood that the law
implies a continuous increase in some property called entropy, which was sup-
posedly defined for systems out of equilibrium. The ongoing, unsatisfactory
debates (see referce [9, for example) about the definition of this nonequilib-
rium entropy and whether it increases shows, in fact, that what is supposedly
“easily” understood needs clarification. Once again, it is a good idea to try to
understand first the meaning of entropy for equilibrium states—the quantity
that our textbooks talk about when they draw Carnot cycles. In this arti-
cle we restrict our attention to just those states; by “state” we always mean
“equilibrium state”. Entropy, as the founders of thermodynamics understood
the quantity is subtle enough, and it is worthwhile to understand the “sec-
ond law” in this restricted context. To do so it is not necessary to decide
whether Boltzmann or Gibbs had the right view on irreversibility. (Their
views are described in Joel L. Lebowitz’s article “Boltzmann’s Entropy and
Time’s Arrow”, Physics Today, September 1993, page 32.)
The basic concepts
To begin at the beginning, we suppose we know what is meant by a thermo-
dynamic system and equilibrium states of such a system. Admittedly these
are not always easy to define, and there are certainly systems, such as a mix-
ture of hydrogen and oxygen or an interstellar ionized gas, that can behave
as if they are in equilibrium even if it is not truly so. The prototypical system
is a “simple system”, consisting of a substance in a container with a piston.
4
But a simple system can be much more complicated than that. Besides its
volume it can have have other coordinates, which can be changed by mechan-
ical or electrical means—shear in a solid, or magnetization, for example. In
any event, a state of a simple system is described by a special coordinate U ,
which is its energy, and one or more other coordinates (such as the volume
V ) called work coordinates. An essential point is that the concept of energy,
which we know about from the moving weight and Newtonian mechanics,
can be defined for thermodynamic systems. This fact is the content of the
first law of thermodynamics.
Another type of system is a “compound system”, which consists of several
different or identical independent, simple systems. By means of mixing or
chemical reactions, systems can be created or destroyed.
Let us briefly discuss some concepts that are relevant for systems and
their states, which are denoted by capital letters such as X,X ′, Y, . . .. Op-
erationally, the composition, denoted (X,X ′), of two states X and X ′ is
obtained simply by putting one system in a state X and one in a state X ′
side by side on the experimental table and regarding them jointly as a state
of a new, compound system. For instance, X could be a glass containing 100
g of whiskey at standard pressure and 20◦ C, and X ′ a glass containing 50
g of ice at standard pressure and 0◦ C. To picture (X,X ′) one should think
the two glasses standing on a table without touching each other.
Another operation is the “scaling” of a state X by a factor λ > 0, leading
to a state denoted λX. Extensive properties like mass, energy and volume
are multiplied by λ, while intensive properties such as pressure stay intact.
For the states X and X ′ as in the example above the example above 1
2
X
is 50 g of whiskey at standard pressure and 20◦ C, and 1
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X ′ is 10 g of ice
at standard pressure and 0◦ C. Compound systems scale in the same way:
1
5
(X,X ′) is 20 g of whiskey and 10 g of ice in separate glasses with pressure
and temperatures as before.
A central notion is adiabatic accessibility. If our gorilla can take a system
from X to Y , as described above—that is, if the only net effect of the action,
besides the state change of the system, is that a weight has possibly been
raised or lowered, we say that Y is adiabatically accessible from X and write
X ≺ Y (the symbol ≺ is pronounced “precedes”). It has to be emphasized
that for macroscopic systems this relation is an absolute one: If a transition
from X to Y is possible at one time, then it is always possible (that is, it is
reproducible), and if it is impossible at one time it never happens. This ab-
solutism is guaranteed by the large powers of 10 involved—the impossibility
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of a chair’s spontaneous jumping up from the floor is an example.
The role of entropy
Now imagine that we are given a list of all possible pairs of states X, Y
such that X ≺ Y . The foundation on which thermodynamics rests, and
the essence of the second law, is that this list can be simply encoded in an
entropy function S on the set of all states of all systems (including compound
systems) so that when X and Y are related at all, then
X ≺ Y if and only if S(X) ≤ S(Y ) .
Moreover, the entropy function can be chosen in such a way that if X and
X ′ are states of two (different or identical) systems, then the entropy of the
compound system in this pair of states is given by
S(X,X ′) = S(X) + S(X ′).
This additivity of entropy is a highly nontrivial assertion. Indeed, it is one of
the most far reaching properties of the second law. In compound systems such
as the whiskey/ice example above, all states (Y, Y ′) such that X ≺ Y and
X ′ ≺ Y ′ are adiabatically accessible from (X,X ′). For instance, by letting
a falling weight run an electric generator one can stir the whiskey and also
melt some ice. But it is important to note that (Y, Y ′) can be adiabatically
accessible from (X,X ′) without Y being adiabatically accessible from X.
Bringing the two glasses into contact and separating them again is adiabatic
for the compound system but the resulting cooling of the whiskey is not
adiabatic for the whiskey alone. The fact that the inequality S(X)+S(X ′) ≤
S(Y ) + S(Y ′) exactly characterizes the possible adiabatic transitions for the
compound system, even when S(X) ≥ S(Y ), is quite remarkable. It means
that it is sufficient to know the entropy of each part of a compound system
in order to decide which transitions due to interactions between these parts
(brought about by the gorilla) are possible.
Closely related to additivity is extensivity, or scaling of entropy,
S(λX) = λS(X),
which means that the entropy of an arbitrary mass of a substance is de-
termined by the entropy of some standard reference mass, such as 1 kg of
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the substance. Without this property engineers would have to use different
steam tables each time they designed a new engine.
In traditional presentations of thermodynamics, based for example on
Kelvin’s principle given above, entropy is arrived at in a rather roundabout
way which tends to obscure its connection with the relation ≺. The basic
message we wish to convey is that existence and uniqueness of entropy are
equivalent to certain simple properties of the relation ≺. This equivalence is
the concern of [2].
An analogy leaps to mind: When can a vector-field, E(x), be encoded in
an ordinary function (potential), φ(x), whose gradient is E? The well-known
answer is that a necessary and sufficient condition is that curlE = 0. The
importance of this encoding does not have to be emphasized to physicists;
entropy’s role is similar to the potential’s role and the existence and meaning
of entropy are not based on any formula such as S = −Σipi ln pi, involving
probabilities pi of “microstates”. Entropy is derived (uniquely, we hope)
from the list of pairs X ≺ Y ; our aim is to figure out what properties of
this list (analogous to the curl-free condition) will allow it to be described
by an entropy. That entropy will then be endowed with an unambiguous
physical meaning independent of anyone’s assumptions about “the arrow of
time”, “coarse graining” and so on. Only the list, which is given by physics,
is important for us now.
The required properties of ≺ do not involve concepts like “heat” or “re-
versible engines”, not even “hot” and “cold” are needed. Besides the “obvi-
ous” conditions “X ≺ X for all X” (reflexivity) and “X ≺ Y and Y ≺ Z
implies X ≺ Z” (transitivity) one needs to know that the relation behaves
reasonably with respect to the composition and scaling of states. By this we
mean the following:
• Adiabatic accessibility is consistent with the composition of states:
X ≺ Y and Z ≺ W implies (X,Z) ≺ (Y,W ).
• Scaling of states does not affect adiabatic accessibility: If X ≺ Y , then
λX ≺ λY .
• Systems can be cut adiabatically into two parts: If 0 < λ < 1, thenX ≺
((1 − λ)X, λX), and the recombination of the parts is also adiabatic:
((1− λ)X, λX) ≺ X.
• Adiabatic accessibility is stable with respect to small perturbations: If
(X, εZ) ≺ (Y, εW ) for arbitrarily small ε > 0, then X ≺ Y .
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These requirements are all very natural. In fact, in traditional approaches
they are usually taken for granted, without mention. They are not quite suf-
ficient, however, to define entropy. A crucial additional ingredient is the
comparison hypothesis for the relation ≺. In essence, this is the hypoth-
esis that all equilibrium states, simple or compound, can be grouped into
classes, such that if X and Y are in the same class, then either X ≺ Y or
Y ≺ X. In nature, a class consists of all states with the same mass and
chemical composition—that is, with the same amount of each of the chem-
ical elements. If chemical reactions and mixing processes are excluded, the
classes are smaller and may be identified with the “systems” in the usual
parlance. But it should be noted that systems can be compound, or consist
of two or more vessels of different substances. In any case, the role of the
comparison hypothesis is to insure that the list of pairs X ≺ Y is sufficiently
long. Indeed, we shall give an example later where the list of pairs satisfies
all the other axioms, but which is not describable by an entropy function.
The construction of entropy
Our main conclusion (which we do not claim isobvious, but whose proof can
be found in reference [2]) is that the existence and uniqueness of entropy
is a consequence of the comparison hypothesis and the assumptions about
adiabatic accessibility stated above. In fact, if X0, X and X1 are three states
of a system and λ is any scaling factor between 0 and 1, then either X ≺
((1− λ)X0, λX1) or ((1− λ)X0, λX1) ≺ X must be true, by the comparison
hypothesis. If both alternatives hold, then the properties of entropy demand
that
S(X) = (1− λ)S(X0) + λS(X1).
If S(X0) 6= S(X1) this equality can hold for at most one λ. With X0 and
X1 as reference states, the entropy is therefore fixed, apart from two free
constants, namely the values S(X0) and S(X1).
From the properties of the relation≺ listed above, one can show that there
is, indeed, always a 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 with the required properties, provided that
X0 ≺ X ≺ X1. It is the largest λ, denoted λmax, such that ((1−λ)X0, λX1) ≺
X. Defining the entropies of the reference states arbitrarily as S(X0) = 0
and S(X1) = 1 unit, we obtain the following simple formula for entropy:
S(X) = λmax units.
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The scaling factors (1 − λ) and λ measure the amount of substance in the
states X0 and X1 respectively. The formula for entropy can therefore be
stated in the following words: S(X) is the maximal fraction of substance in
the state X1 that can be transformed adiabatically (that is, in the sense of
≺) into the state X with the aid of a complementary fraction of substance in
the state X0. This way of measuring S in terms of substance is reminiscent
of an old idea, suggested by Pierre Laplace and Antoine Lavoisier, that heat
be measured in terms of the amount of ice melted in a process. As a concrete
example, let us assume that X is a state of liquid water, X0 of ice and X1 of
vapor. Then S(X) for a kilogram of liquid, measured with the entropy of a
kilogram of water vapor as a unit, is the maximal fraction of a kilogram of
vapor that can be transformed adiabatically into liquid in state X with the
aid of a complementary fraction of a kilogram of ice.
In this example the maximal fraction λmax cannot be achieved by simply
exposing the ice to the vapor, causing the former to melt and the latter to
condense. This would be an irreversible process—that is, it would not be
possible to reproduce the initial amounts of vapor of ice adiabatically (in
the sense of the definition given earlier) from the liquid. By contrast, λmax
is uniquely determined by the requirement that one can pass adiabatically
from X to ((1 − λmax)X0, λmaxX1) and vice versa. For this transformation
it is necessary to extract or add energy in the form of work—for example
by running a little reversible Carnot machine that transfers energy between
the high-temperature and low-temperature parts of the system. We stress,
however, that neither the concept of a “reversible Carnot machine” nor that
of “temperature” is needed for the logic behind the formula for entropy given
above. We mention these concepts only to relate our definition of entropy to
concepts for which the reader may have an intuitive feeling.
By interchanging the roles of the three states, the definition of entropy
is easily extended to situations where X ≺ X0 or X1 ≺ X. Moreover, the
reference points X0 and X1, where the entropy is defined to be 0 and 1 unit
respectively, can be picked consistently for different systems such that the
entropy will satisfy the crucial additivity and extensivity conditions
S(X,X ′) = S(X) + S(X ′) and S(λX) = λS(X).
It is important to understand that once the existence and uniqueness of
entropy has been established one need not rely on the λmax formula displayed
above to determine it in practice. There are various experimental means
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to determine entropy that are usually much more practical. The standard
method consists of measuring pressures, volumes and temperatures (on some
empirical scale), as well as specific and latent heats. The empirical tempera-
tures are converted into absolute temperatures T (by means of formulas that
follow from the mere existence of entropy but do not involve S directly), and
the entropy is computed by means of formulas like ∆S =
∫
(dU + PdV )/T ,
with P the pressure. The existence and uniqueness of entropy implies that
this formula is independent of the path of integration.
Comparability of states
The possibility of defining entropy entirely in terms of the relation ≺ was first
clearly stated by Giles [7]. (Giles’s definition is different from ours, albeit
similar in spirit.) The importance of the comparison hypothesis had been
realized earlier, however [4, 5, 6]. All these authors take the comparison
hypothesis as a postulate—that is, they do not attempt to justify it from
other simpler premises. However, it is in fact possible to derive comparability
for any pair of states of the same system from some natural and directly
accessible properties of the relation≺ [2]. In this derivation of comparison the
customary parametrization of states in terms of energy and work coordinates
is used, but it has to be stressed that such parametrizations are irrelevant,
and therefore not used, for our definition of entropy—once the comparison
hypothesis is established.
To appreciate the significance of the comparison hypothesis it may be
helpful to consider the following example. Imagine a world whose thermody-
namical sytems consist exclusively of incompressible solid bodies. Moreover,
all adiabatic state changes in this world are supposed to be obtained by
means of the following elementary operations:
• Mechanical rubbing of the individual systems, increasing their energy.
• Thermal equilibration in the conventional sense (by bringing the sys-
tems into contact.)
The state space of the compound system consisting of two identical bod-
ies, 1 and 2, can be paramertized by their energies, U1 and U2. IfX = (U1, U2)
and Y == (U ′
1
, U ′
2
) are such that U ′
1
< U1 < U2 < U
′
2
and U1 +U2 < U
′
1
+U ′
2
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then one finds that that neither X ≺ Y nor Y ≺ X holds. The compari-
son hypothesis is therefore violated in this hypothetical example, and it is
not possible to characterize adiabatic accessibility by means of an additive
entropy function. A major part of our work consists of understanding why
such situations do not happen—why the comparison hypothesis appears to
be true in the real world.
The derivation of the comparison hypothesis is based on an analysis of
simple systems, which are the building blocks of thermodynamics. As already
mentioned the states of such systems are described by one energy coordinate
U and at least one work coordinate, like the volume V . The following con-
cepts play a key role in this analysis:
• The possibility of forming “convex combinations” of states of simple
systems with respect to the energy U and volume V (or other work
coordinates). This means that given any two states X and Z of one
kilogram of our system one can pick any state Y on the line between
them in U , V space and, by taking appropriate fractions λ and 1 − λ
in states X and Z, respectively, there will be an adiabatic process
taking this pair of states into the state Y . This process is usually
quite elementary. For example, for gases and liquids one need only
remove the barrier that separates the two fractions of the system. The
fundamental property of entropy increase will then tell us that S(Y ) ≥
λS(X) + (1 − λ)S(Z). As Gibbs emphasized, this “concavity” is the
basis for thermodynamical stability—namely positivity of specific heats
and compressibilities.
• The existence of at least one irreversible adiabatic state change, starting
from any given state. In conjuction with concavity of S this seemingly
weak requirement excludes the possibility that the entropy is constant
in a whole neighborhood of some state. The classical formulations of
the second law follow from this.
• The concept of thermal equilibrium between simple systems, which
means, operationally, that no state changes takes place when the sys-
tems are allowed to exchange energy with each other at fixed work
coordinates. The zeroth law of thermodynamic says that if two sys-
tems are in thermal equilibrium with a third, then they are in thermal
equilibrium with one another. This property is essential for the additiv-
ity of entropy, because it allows a consistent adjustment of the entropy
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unit for different systems. It leads to a definition of temperature by
the usual formula 1/T = (∂S/∂U)V .
Using these notions (and a few others of a more technical nature) the
comparison hypothesis can be established for all simple systems and their
compounds.
It is more difficult to justify the comparability of states if mixing processes
or chemical reactions are taken into account. In fact, although a mixture of
whiskey and water at 0◦ C is obviously adiabatically accessible from separate
whiskey and ice by pouring whiskey from one glass onto the rocks in the
other glass, it is not possible to reverse this process adiabatically. Hence
it is not clear that a block of a frozen whiskey/water mixture at −10◦ C,
say, is at all related in the sense of ≺ to a state in which whiskey and
water are in separate glasses. Textbooks usually appeal here to gedanken
experiments with “semipermeable membrane” that let only water molecules
through and withhold the whiskey molecules, but such membranes really
exist only in the mind [10]. However, without invoking any such device, it
turns out to be possible to shift the entropy scales of the various substances
in such a way that X ≺ Y always implies S(X) ≤ S(Y ). The converse
assertion, namely, S(X) ≤ S(Y ) implies X ≺ Y provided X and Y have the
same chemical composition, cannot be guaranteed a priori for mixing and
chemical reactions, but it is empirically testable and appears to be true in
the real world. This aspect of the second law, comparability, is not usually
stressed, but it is important; it is challenging to figure out how to turn
the frozen whiskey/water block into a glass of whiskey and a glass of water
without otherwise changing the universe, except for moving a weight, but
such an adiabatic process is possible.
What has been gained?
The line of thought that started more than forty years ago has led to an
axiomatic foundation for thermodynamics. It is appropriate to ask what if
anything has been gained compared to the usual approaches involving quasi-
static processes and Carnot machines on the one hand and statistical me-
chanics on the other hand. There are several points. One is the elimination
of intuitive, but hard-to-define concepts like “hot”, “cold” and “heat”. An-
other is the recognition of entropy as a codification of possible state changes,
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X ≺ Y , that can be accomplished without changing the rest of the universe
in any way except for moving a weight. Temperature is eliminated as an a
priori concept and appears in its natural place as a quantity derived from
entropy and whose consistent definition really depends on the existence of en-
tropy, rather than the other way around. To define enetropy, there is no need
for special machines and processes on the empirical side, and there is no need
for assumptions about models on the statistical mechanical side. Just as en-
ergy conservation was eventually seen to be a consequence of time translation
invariance, in like manner entropy can be seen to be a consequence of some
simple properties of the list of state pairs related by adiabatic accessibility.
If the second law can be demystified, so much the better. If it can be
seen to be a consequence of simple, plausible notions then, as Einstein said,
it cannot be overthrown.
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